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BOOK REVIEWS
UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED: THE DESIGNED-IN DANGERS OF
THE AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE by Ralph Nader (Grossman
Publishers, 1965. Pp. 365. $5.95).
Ralph Nader is a Washington, D. C., attorney whose neces-
sarily involuntary client is every one of us. He has written an
exhaustive and completely convincing brief on the facts of
today's death-dealing automobiles and on the law as it should
be developed in order to save countless lives.
On the facts Mr. Nader is superb. He has not done merely the
usual reporter's job of learning enough facts to write an expose;
instead, he has set out over a period of years to become the na-
tion's leading lay expert on the dangers of today's automobiles-
and clearly has succeeded. Every major hazard from the back-
wards ramming steering column to the pedestrian-spearing tail
fin is documented through engineering test data, where appli-
cable, and through a recounting of actual accidents. The portion
of the book that has received the most publicity deals with de-
fects in design and in production which have in themselves
caused accidents. However, Nader stresses that an even more
common cause of death and serious injury is the failure of
Detroit to make any serious effort to lessen, or at least not to
magnify, the effects of accidents that it cannot currently pre-
vent. Deadly knobs and edges within the car, doors that fly
open when an occupant is thrown against them, steering columns
that in an otherwise minor front-end collision will thrust at the
driver, sharp front-end protuberances that maximize injuries
when a pedestrian is hit-on and on runs the ghastly catalog.
Mr. Nader cites expert opinion-where common sense does not
suffice-to show that all of these dangers can be economically
avoided-sometimes, of course, even through a saving of money
otherwise spent on garish ornamentation.
A large part of the book is concerned with the arguments and
rationalizations that industry spokesmen have offered in an
attempt to explain away their virtually unique failure to make
significant progress in safety through technological innovation
over the last few decades. These excuses are almost pathetic in
their speciousness and the author labors the obvious in demolish-
ing them. Perhaps the most prevalent excuse is the notion that
the fault lies with the consumer who must somehow demand a
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safer car before any moral duty on the part of the manufacturer
can arise. In answer, Mr. Nader shows that the industry has
never made any determined effort to make and market a safer
car to which the consumer could turn. Further, the book de-
scribes at length the industry's efforts to distract public atten-
tion from the need for safer cars and to control and silence
any research efforts aimed at delineating possible safety
improvements. Some of the industry's ways of avoiding the
basic issue would be the stuff of high comic satire except that
they are the outrageous truth. For example, General Motors
concentrates most of its crash research efforts on telling highway
designers how to build safer highways.1
What legal remedies should be applied to foster safer cars?
It is obvious that the threat of liability under established tort
principles is insufficiently great to deter the manufacture of
unsafe cars. The reasons are not hard to find. Many more in-
juries and deaths are caused by needlessly dangerous design
than by defects in production, and it is difficult to prove negli-
gence or even a design defect when all automobile manufacturers
are doing just about the same thing. Contributory negligence
and the prevalent doctrine that products need only be safe for
their intended use, which does not include collisions,2 present
further obstacles. Even where the accident was in fact caused by
legally cognizable negligence, the relevant evidence may be
destroyed in the accident or simply not discovered for lack of
proper inspection. The result is that automobile manufacturers
who strive to achieve a perfect safety record for employees in
their plants-to avoid accidents they would have to pay for-
largely ignore safety in the design of their automobiles. On the
other hand, where the accident itself-and not just the resulting
injury-was proximately caused by negligence in design or
manufacture, the plaintiff, of course, need look no further than
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.3 to establish his case. Also,
where the manufacturer has failed to give reasonably effective
warning of the dangers which may be encountered under given
1. R. NAmn, UNSAFE AT AxY SiEED 179 (1965).
2. See Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. .- (1966). Cf. General Motors Corp. v. Muncy, 367 F.2d
493 (5th Cir. 1966) ; Gossett v. Chrysler Corp., 359 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1966);
Hatch v. Ford Motor Corp., 163 Cal. App. 2d 393, 329 P.2d 605 (1958).
3. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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conditions, and this leads to an accident, the plaintiff should
often be able to prevail.4
Nevertheless, this book dramatizes an obvious need for legis-
lation to set standards of safety in automobile design and manu-
facture. Largely because of Mr. Nader's efforts to mobilize
public opinion, Congress last summer gave the Secretary of
Commerce, acting through the newly established National Traf-
fic Safety Bureau, power to set minimum standards of safe
design and manufacture of automobilesY Such standards are
being formulated with all possible speed. 6 When strict standards
have been in existence long enough that a large proportion of
the cars on the highways will have been manufactured subject
to them, we will doubtless see a dramatic reversal of the present
inexorable increase in the highway death and injury toll. Many
will then wonder how unsafe automobiles could have been tole-
rated for so long. An even more interesting subject for specula-
tion is this: how much longer might safety in automobiles have
been slighted but for Mr. Nader's efforts?
KENMETH J. WAHL
Assistant Professor of Law
University of South Carolina
4. See generally Dillard & Hart, Product Liability and the Duty to Warn,
41 VA. L. Rxv. 145 (1955). A possible example of such a case is General
Motors' failure to warn its Corvair owners that the large front-rear differ-
ential in tire pressures "recommended" in the owner's manual is essential to
safe handling. See R. NADER, UNsAFE AT ANY SPEED 1-41 (1965).
5. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1425 (Supp. 1966).
6. The wide-ranging subject matter of the initial regulations, issued Janu-
ary 31, 1967 as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1392(h) (Supp. 1966), is conveniently
summarized at 35 U.S.L.W. 2455 (1967).
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